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Sclove: Statutory Construction--Applicability of Workmen's Compensation A
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the right of the public to assess against land for public use is paramount to any vested right of ownership."
A third case decides
that as no notice is required to anyone for general taxes," the
reason for which is mere maintainence of government, no notice
should be required in special assessments to an interested party,
such as a mortgagee, because he is theoretically receiving an enhancement to the -value of the property held under lien."
However, there must be some other reason back of this nominal
rationale.
Courts have sympathized with the position of the
mortgagee, but regret their inability to assist him."
Do not the
courts seem to balance the purely contingent and defeasible right
of the mortgagee against the administrative inconvenience to be
caused by the requirement of notice to the lienholder?
Couple
also the fact that it would by analogy lead to the same requirement for all other lienholders and it seems fit to require that the
mortgagee to on the'"qui vive" rather than to adopt another
prerequisite to the validity of an essentially difficult administrative function. In any event it would appear that the rule of
Mortgage Company of Maryland v. Lory will remain settled law
for West Virginia.
-HENRY

P. SNYDER.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-APPLICABILITY OF WORKMEN'S CozaPENSATION ACT TO INTERSTATE EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN INTRASTATE

WORK AT TrIE OF INJURY.-In Towns v. Monongahela Railway
Company1 an employee, who was engaged at time in both interstate and intrastate work, sued his interstate employer.
A hand car, which he and others were busily pumping
along the main line towards an unfinished sidetrack,' was
"Murphy v. Beard, 138 Ind. 560, 38 N. E. 33 (1894); Wilson v. Cal.
Bank, 121 Cal. 630, 54 Pac. 119 (1898); Norwich v. Hubbard, supra n. 12;
People v. Weber, 164 Ill. 412, 45 N. E. 723 (1897); Dressman v. Simonin,
104 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767 (1898).
Does this consist with the idea that
notice should be prerequisite to the exercise of this public right?
"DiLLonT, op. cit. supra n. 2; McQUiLLIN, op. ct. supra n. 2.
20Supra n. 8.
17Norwich v. Hubbard, supra n. 12.
1153 S. E. 919 (W. Va. 1930).
'The siding, in process of original construction for a
products in both interstate and intrastate commerce, was
to the main line. It was not, therefore, an instrumentality
merce. McKee v. Elec. Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 131, 88 S.
ROBERTS, FEDERAL LIBImLy O' CARRIERS (2nd ed. 1929)

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

plant shipping its
as yet unconnected
of interstate comE. 616 (1916); 2
§ 761,

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1930], Art. 15
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTEIRLY
derailed when the forman failed to see the signal for an open
switch. The character of his work at the time of injury was so
clearing intrastate,3 that it was previously held error to have
submitted that question to the jury.' Recovery for the foreman's
negligence, which must therefore be based on common law princi.
ples as administered by state courts rather than on federal law,'
was denied. Since the Workmeu's Compensation Act clearly ex.
eludes such employees from its operationI the coercive feature of
the act' does not apply here to deny the railway company its common law defense of the fellow servant rule.
This decision as to the construction of the state law merely reiterates others.' In Barnett v. Coal and Coke Railway Company'
the court said that the act10 had been so framed to avoid conflict
Towns was bound for intrastate work and was paid for the time spent in
getting there as if actually on the job.
Towns v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 105 W. Va. 572, 144 S. E. 289 (1928).
"The
"
common law rule, absolving the master from liability for injuries
to a servant caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, was abolished
as to all interstate employees of carriers" by § 1 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. 2 ROBERTS, op. cit. supra n. 2, § 799.
0
W. Va. Acts 1925, c. 68, § 52.
7W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 15P, § 26, denies such common
law defenses as the fellow servant rule to employers included within the
operation of the act who have not elected to pay premiums into the fund.
8Interstate employers not included within the operation of the compensation act are not denied common law defense in action by ther employees.
Adams v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 102 W. Va. ,36, 135 S. E.
662 (1926) (employee engaged in interstate work, recovery at common law
sustained); Shaffer v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 93 W. Va. 300, "116 S. E.
747 (1923) (employee engaged in interstate work, recovery based on federal
act sustained); Halley v. Ohio Valley Elec. Ry. Co., 92 W. Va. 172, 114 S.
E. 572 (1922) (employee engaged in interstate work, recovery based on
federal act sustained); Smith v. United Fuel Gas Co., 91 W. Va. 52, 112
S. E. 205 (1922) (employee engaged in interstate work, federal act not relied upon, recovery denied); Miller v. United Fuel Gas Co., 88 W. Va. 82,
106 S. E. 419 (1921) (employee engaged partly in intrastate and partly in
interstate work, state act depriving employer of common law defenses inapplicable, recovery denied); Roberts v. United Fuel Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 368,
99 S. E. 549 (1919) (employee's general work wholly intrastate, state act
applied unconditionally, recovery sustained); Suttle v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 82 W. Va. 729, 97 S. E. 429 (1918) (employee's general work wholly
intrastate, state act applicable unconditionally); Barnett v. Coal & Coke By.
Co., 81 W. Va. 251, 94 S. E. 150 (1917) (employee engaged partly in intrastate and partly in interstate work, state act inapplicable).
' Barnett v. Ry. Co., supra n. 8, at 259. Here employer's counsel in their
brief suggested that "one obvious purpose of excluding these twilight zone
relationships from the normal application of the law is to relieve those responsible for the administration of the statute from the extremely difficult
task of deciding how near the line of interstate commerce their jurisdiction
extends."
10W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 10, § 52.
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The
with congressional jurisdiction over interstate commerce.'
language of the amended act, which governed the Towns Case, is
even more compelling as to construction." After making the usual
provision for an election to come under the operation of the act,
Section 52 concludes: "the act shall not apply to employees of employers engaged in interstate commerce".' This proviso," striking
expressly at the Towns situation, has since been changed to read:
"the chapter shall not apply to employees of steam railroads,steam
railroads partly electrified, or express companies engaged in interstate commerce"."
The legislature, in this instance, seems to have been overzealous
to avoid the possibility of encroaching upon federal jurisdiction. In
avoiding a difficult situation," it has denied this employee the
benefit of the state law and has left him without any remedy; yet,
Towns is certainly a proper subject for the application of the
humanitarian principles which underlie the compensation act.
Should not the same coercion apply to deny his interstate employer
the common law defense of the fellow servant rule as applies to
those employers already included within the act? In both cases
intrastatework is involved. And the very federal law," as to which
"An Ohio statute was similarly construed when the court took judicial
notice of the legislative journals to find that by deliberate action the general
assembly had inserted words of limitation upon the operation of the act.
Connole v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 216 Fed. 823 (1914).
"W. Va. Acts 1925, e. 68, § 52.
Italics here and subsequently are ours.
"4Previously the cases distinguished between an employee of an interstate employer whose general work was wholly intrastate and clearly separable
from work in interstate commerce, and such an employee engaged partly
in intrastate and partly in interstate work. As to the former the act was
said to apply unconditionally; as to the latter only conditionally upon an
election. Miller v. Gas Co., Roberts v. Gas Co., Suttle v. Gas Co., Barnett
v. Ry. Co., all supra n. 8. The proviso would now seem to prevent the application of the act unconditionally even to the former type.
"W. Va. Acts 1929, c.71, § 52.
11,,In such cases it is nearly always difficult to mark out the dividing line
between intrastate end interstate commerce, and to tell where a given
There is what has been
service in the one leaves off and the other begins.
termed a 'twilght zone'-a sort of no man's land .... " Halley v. Elec. Ry.
Co., supra n. 8, at 182.
"7If the federal act is inapplicable in the Towns Case, because the application of that act depends upon the character of the work at the time of
injury which was there intrastate; then, the state act should not exclude
To
Towns from its benefits simply because he had an interstate employer.
do so substitutes character of employer for character of work.
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!he legislature was so careful, is only applicable when the character of the work at the time of injury is clearly interstate!'
Why not, then, amend the state law to cover expressly all situations beyond the purview of the federal law so as to carry out
thoroughly and harmoniously the admitted social policy of placing the risk of industrial accidents upon industry?1"

-A.

BERNARD SCLOvE.

TmTIo-THE TAxmTG SITUs OF INTANGIBIL.-A resident of

Illinois dying there, possessed bonds, promissory notes, and certificates for money on deposit all physically within the state of
Missouri. Illinois collected an inheritance tax on all his intagibles
including those above-mentioned in Missouri. Missouri also asserts a right to tax the intangibles within her boundaries. Held,
said bonds, notes, and certificates of deposit were not within the
jurisdiction of Missouri for taxation purposes. The Court said
the bonds, notes and certificates of deposit were merely evidence
of the debts and like all intangibles their situs for taxation was the
domicile of the creditor; to allow Missouri to collect the tax would
violate the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Baldwin v. State of Missouri.'
the Employers' Liability Act a right of recovery exists only
l8"Under
where the enjury is suffered while the carrier is engaged in interstate comPedersen
merce and while the employee is employed in such commerce."
v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, Ann. Cas.
1914 C, 153 (1913). "The true test of employment in such commerce (interstate) in the sense intended is, was the employee, at the time of injury,
engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as
2 ROBERTS, Op. cit. supra n. 2, § § 723
to be practically a part of it?"

724, 727.
10"The Workmen's Compensation Law was passed pursuant to a widespread belief in its value as a means of protecting workingmen and their
dependents from want in case of injury when engaged in certain speified
hazardous employments." Post v. Burger, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E.- 351
(1916), aff'g 168 App. Div. 403, 153 N. Y. Supp. 505.

1281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930), Mr. Justice Holmes, Brandeis and
Holmes in his opinion laments the reversal of Blackstone v.
Stone dissent.
Miller, supra. He says, "I have not yet adequately expressed the more than
anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth
Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be constitutional rights of
the States.
As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the
sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority
of this Court as for any reason undesirable".
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